You can’t make peace without talking to those doing the fighting. An obvious statement perhaps, but one that in practice presents various challenges.
Governments and political actors are understandably averse; the choices around engagement with armed groups are complex, risky and highly political, and potentially unpopular with an electorate.
But talking to an armed group in the interests of peace does not necessarily denote recognising their aims and means, nor is it a reward for violence. And in many conflicts there are those who can and already do talk to armed groups in a range of constructive ways – to encourage return, to provide space for self-reflection and challenge, or to prepare them for constructive peace negotiations.
Governments need to explore a wider range of options for engagement with armed groups and to consider the following as guiding principles for doing so:
Start from a position of engagement based on dialogue and consider the obstacles to engagement
As we have seen in Northern Ireland, Iraq and now Afghanistan, despite an initial position against direct or indirect diplomatic contact with armed groups, in reality, and often after many years of conflict, governments almost always come round to engagement.
We suggest that from the outset there should be an explicit presumption that it is politically and legally acceptable – and indeed useful – to engage with an armed group for the purposes of resolving violent conflict. Such a position obviously requires taking calculated and managed risks, but our experience in diverse contexts such as the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict, Mindanao in the Philippines, and Colombia, suggests that the risks are worth taking in the interests of peace.
However, shifting the focus to engagement does require a reassessment of the obstacles to doing so, including proscription – the listing of armed groups as terrorist organisations. In our experience proscription is rarely integrated into wider efforts to promote long term peace. The lack of transparency in how groups are listed and delisted and on which lists they appear, and the failure to understand fully the impact of proscription on a conflict context, means that its broader conflict prevention benefits are negligible and at best short-term.
Moreover, obstructing, and indeed criminalising, contact by third parties with proscribed armed groups diminishes the space for dialogue and for third-party mediators to operate. The effects of proscription can be at odds with its intended purpose; in fact it can weaken moderate elements in an armed group and can feed perceptions of exclusion among constituencies who may share a group’s aspirations if not their methods.
Consider and employ a broader range of options to influence armed groups
There is a range of modes and levels of engagement available to influence and transform armed groups. Much can happen below the radar – without in any way being construed as recognition or legitimisation of a group or its tactics – which can prepare the ground for political settlements.
Particular governments, groups and NGOs – local and international – may have influence on an armed group due to perceived political impartiality, access or relationships of trust. Low-level contacts between an armed group and civil society, community or religious leaders, for example, can test appetite for dialogue and negotiation, and help improve understanding of the dynamics and motivations of a group.
Regional governments also wield influence on armed groups; addressing and mediating the regional tensions which affect a conflict – such as the antagonism between Khartoum and Uganda in the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict – can in turn alter the course and strength of an armed group.
Providing non-state armed groups with space for self-reflection is rare, but essential. It helps them reassess their objectives and methods, and re-examine the root causes of conflict and the best way to address them. To this end, Conciliation Resources and others in the peacebuilding field seek to provide critical challenge and encourage armed groups to think more broadly and strategically about non-violent ways to achieve their aims.
Develop and employ good practice in engaging armed groups
The internal dynamics of non-state armed groups are complex, and members may have differing and contradictory motives. Governments tend to lack in-house expertise in this area and, as a result, the official range of tools and options for engagement is limited.
Employing monetary incentives to encourage groups to turn away from violence is of questionable benefit as, rather than shifting positions, this can inspire cynicism and rent seeking in an armed group and offer a temporary fix rather than address an underlying issue.
The adoption of internal ‘good practice’ to guide official government approaches to engaging armed groups is therefore essential. Decisions – be they to arm, proscribe or engage – must be based at the very least on a full understanding of the realities of the conflict dynamics and the range of perspectives of actors within a conflict system.
Finally, it should be recognised that the space for engagement at a higher political level has often been made possible by years of painstaking work by community organisations, activists and NGOs to maintain and build links and trust. This should be recognised and supported by policymakers in specific cases as well as more generally, and be seen as a fundamental aspect of conflict transformation.
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Dr Teresa Dumasy, Head of Policy and Learning at peacebuilding NGO Conciliation Resources.
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It was every good and detailed discussion. Very beneficial to a student conflict transformation studies, as there was much to learn from.
A most interesting article and within the context of Northern Ireland spot on. Your insight into the inability of government to step up to the mark but more than this continuing actions to remove the funds etc from community groups and indeed special appointed bodies who are having success on a progressively expanding bases is so very true.it is my belief that it is because these people have no concept of what is required or the effort necessary.
This is just my point of view as a person educated under NDEA Title VI to learn a strategic language, in my case Tamil. If you are going to make a difference in any country, you have to commit to the people of that country, settle there, learn all you can about that country before and after you go there, converse with the people in their own language, get to know them. An in-and-out, blanket negotiation strategy will not work. You can and must learn from other negotiators in other countries. Dr. Dumasy is absolutely right. Learning in detail about the ground situation as it changes, and the people involved in or caught in the conflict situation is essential. And all of this takes time. But people of that area, including combatants, will not trust you if you cannot converse with both the powerless and the powerful, combatants and non-combatants in their own language, live with them, learn from them, show your ability to trust them as much as you hope they will trust you. There are no guarantees. You may get killed. But I believe there are people who are willing to take the time, endure the hardships, and risk their lives to help rather than to kill.
‘You can’t make peace without talking to those doing the fighting’. i agree with the author of this article. many peace accord are done without those who are doing the fighting and that is why positive peace cannot be achieved.